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2 
Abstract 24 
 25 
One of the challenges of collaboration is to coordinate decisions with others, and recent theories have 26 
proposed that humans in particular evolved skills to address this challenge. To test this hypothesis we compared 27 
the coordination abilities of 4 year old children and chimpanzees with a simple coordination problem. To 28 
retrieve a reward from a ‘puzzle box’ pairs of individuals were simply required to choose the same one of four 29 
options. If successful they each received the same reward, so there were no conflicts of interest. Individuals 30 
were paired with multiple partners over time. Both species were able to coordinate, but there were marked 31 
differences in the way they did so. Children were able to coordinate quickly and flexibly, adjusting easily to new 32 
partners, suggesting an understanding of the coordination process. In contrast, chimpanzees took time to 33 
converge on a single solution with each new partner, with no gains across partners, suggesting that their 34 
coordination was based only on repeating successful past choices. Together, these results support the hypothesis 35 
that humans have evolved unique skills for coordinating decisions and actions with others in the pursuit of 36 
common interests. 37 
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Introduction 40 
 41 
 It is the diversity, as well as the extent, of cooperation that is a distinguishing feature of the human 42 
species. Yet, the vast majority of research on cooperation focuses on the motivational challenges it presents for 43 
individuals, for example, how individuals overcome the temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others, or to 44 
defect altogether to do something more personally rewarding. Typically, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods 45 
Game, or other similar ‘mixed motives’ games in which there is a conflict of interest between the self and 46 
others, have been used to model these types of interactions (e.g. Fehr & Gaechter, 2000; Ostrom, 1998). 47 
These games only represent part of human cooperation. Much of what humans do is mutualistic. By 48 
working together, we can produce or acquire benefits that would be unattainable for the individual. For example: 49 
hunting large game requires coordinated action of multiple individuals (e.g. Alvard & Nolin, 2002). If hunters 50 
fail to do their part the hunt fails and there are no benefits for anyone. Consequently, more research has recently 51 
focused on coordination games (see e.g. Balliet, Tybur, & Van Lange, 2017; Bardsley, Cubitt, et al., 2010; 52 
Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2014; Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015a, 2015b; Mehta, Starmer, & 53 
Sugden, 1994a, 1994b; Parravano & Poulsen, 2015; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013) . These differ from 54 
mixed motives games in that individuals have matching interests and there are several ways of cooperating 55 
successfully. Individuals therefore do not have to choose between selfish and cooperative acts but instead have 56 
to collectively agree on one particular way of cooperating, e.g. which side of the road to drive on benefits 57 
everyone by reducing the likelihood of crashing into other drivers and maintaining the flow of traffic (Lewis, 58 
1969; Schelling, 1960). Coordination games thus comprise a cognitive challenge, namely, to align one’s 59 
decisions with others in the pursuit of common goals. This is not as trivial as it might seem. Since there can only 60 
be success if both partners choose the same solution, i.e. the decisions are highly interdependent, each individual 61 
only wants to choose a particular option if a partner does so too. This situation can potentially lead to paralysis, 62 
as each individual waits for the other to show her hand or otherwise commit to cooperation in a particular 63 
direction. 64 
 One especially interesting and important coordination situation for understanding the evolution of 65 
human cooperation is the stag hunt game. In this game individuals have the choice between a moderately 66 
rewarding option representing no risk (“hare”) and a riskier but more rewarding option that can only be obtained 67 
via cooperation with a partner (“stag”). Consequently, the decision to cooperate comes with the risk of losing 68 
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both options if a partner does not also choose to cooperate (Skyrms, 2004). How we play this game informs us 69 
about how we mitigate the risks of cooperation in the absence of potential cheaters (which is why it is also 70 
known as the assurance game). Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 71 
2012) argue that many of the unique features of human cognition and sociality evolved to meet the challenges of 72 
stag hunt type situations, especially in the context of collaborative foraging such as big game hunting when prey 73 
cannot be captured independently. For example, humans have highly distinctive forms of cooperative 74 
communication - the natural gestures of pointing and pantomiming, as well as conventional linguistic 75 
communication - might have evolved to overcome the challenges of coordinating (Tomasello, 2008, 2014). In 76 
the case of the stag hunt, communicating one's intentions, or providing a partner with information about the 77 
location of a “stag”, can facilitate the coordination of decisions to cooperate as well as to plan the specifics of 78 
the cooperation itself (see e.g. Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). 79 
 Support for this general proposal is provided by a recent study comparing how human children and 80 
their nearest great ape relatives, chimpanzees, coordinate decisions to cooperate. Duguid et al. (2014) presented 81 
pairs of four-year-old children and pairs of chimpanzees with two tasks with the overall structure of a stag hunt 82 
game. During the games, the participants could choose between collecting a relatively low value reward 83 
independently (e.g. cereal puffs) or working together by pulling two ends of a rope to release a higher value 84 
reward (e.g. gummibears).In the first version of the game, risks were low (the hare was of low value) and 85 
information was cheap (the partner's behavior was readily observable). In this case, partners of both species 86 
were able to coordinate successfully on the higher value stag more than 90% of the time, typically by one 87 
individual assuming all the risk and deciding to go for the stag unilaterally, with the other then following at 88 
basically no risk (a so-called leader-follower strategy; see Bullinger, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). In contrast, 89 
when the risks were raised and observing the partner was more difficult, the chimpanzees became less 90 
successful, whereas the children compensated, and so remained highly successful, by communicating their 91 
intention to cooperate or information about the stag aimed at influencing the partner’s decision. Further studies 92 
with the stag hunt using different methods – token exchange and computer-based tasks - in which participants 93 
could explore the reward contingencies, also found that different primate species could sometimes find the best 94 
outcome of coordinating on the stag token, especially chimpanzees. However, only humans could do so reliably, 95 
particularly when they communicated about the task (Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan, Wilson, & Beran, 2012; 96 
Parrish, 2014).  97 
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 There are many possible reasons for the different ways that chimpanzees and human children 98 
coordinate their decisions in stag hunt type situations, ranging from different skills of communication to 99 
different attitudes toward risk to different cognitive abilities. The issue is certainly not that chimpanzees cannot 100 
coordinate their actions with others at all; wild chimpanzees do this regularly in such activities as group hunting, 101 
border patrols, and inter-group conflicts, and coalitions in intragroup dominance contests (Watts & Mitani, 102 
2002). Moreover, several experimental studies with captive chimpanzees have shown that they are able to 103 
coordinate their actions in order to acquire rewards which are inaccessible to individuals acting alone (e.g. 104 
(Chalmeau, 1994; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). Coordination failure in chimpanzees 105 
thus does not appear to be related to difficulties in coordinating actions in time and space, but rather in 106 
coordinating their decisions with each other– a skill at which humans seemingly excel. This still leaves open 107 
many questions about the nature of the species difference. 108 
 One way to begin to identify the nature of the species difference in more detail is to present the two 109 
species with a novel but very simple pure coordination problem (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960). In pure 110 
coordination games individuals will be successful if they both choose the same option out of several equally 111 
rewarding possibilities (and they do not have to risk any safe options to do so). The game is simple in the sense 112 
that all of the potential solutions to the problem are equal in value and in risk (unlike in the stag hunt). Unlike in 113 
the stag hunt, there is not one highly rewarding (and thus salient) option so players cannot succeed by choosing 114 
this obvious solution, assuming a partner will do the same; they have to find another way to converge on a 115 
solution. We might say that the coordination problem in the stag hunt game could be formulated as: “Will my 116 
partner choose the stag?” and in the pure coordination game as: “Which stag will my partner choose?” Formal 117 
mathematical theory struggles to explain how people generate solutions to such problems, but humans, 118 
including children, do surprisingly well at solving them without communication, based on such things as 119 
precedence (repeating previous solutions) and salience (using the unique solution; Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, & 120 
Sugden, 2010; Camerer, 2003; Grueneisen et al., 2015a; Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015).  121 
 Classically, coordination is difficult when the individuals cannot communicate or otherwise directly see 122 
what their potential partner is doing, and so they must find another way to create a "meeting of minds" (e.g., 123 
locating one another after a concert by both going to our shared car, because that is such an obvious thing for 124 
both of us to do). The simplest conceivable coordination situation is one in which both partners can see one 125 
another and are free to communicate as they are making their decisions. However, coordination problems in a 126 
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broad sense frequently occur even with total informational access among partners.  As an example, you may 127 
have experienced the situation in which you are walking towards another pedestrian on the footpath, and you 128 
have to decide whether you are both going left or right. Sometimes there is a little to-and-fro but in general this 129 
is a trivial problem for adults; however, this may not be the case for young children or chimpanzees. In the 130 
current study, therefore, we presented both chimpanzees (study 1) and young children (study 2) with a very 131 
simple coordination problem. To obtain rewards, two individuals each had to go to the same box, out of a row of 132 
four boxes, and press a button on their side. The pair had full visual access to one another and were free to 133 
communicate as they wished. Additionally, subjects did not have to press the buttons simultaneously but could 134 
do so sequentially, thus precise behavioral coordination was unnecessary. Our aim was to investigate the 135 
spontaneous strategies used to coordinate decisions so by reducing the behavioral coordination demands we 136 
allowed for the possibility of strategies such as a leader-follower strategy. 137 
Our main measures of coordination success were a) the number of sessions until the criterion for 138 
reliable coordination was reached and b) how successful they were in the first session with each partner. Once 139 
coordinating reliably with their first partner, subjects were paired with new partners. If pairs were using a 140 
flexible strategy such as communicating about decisions then we would expect that changing partners would do 141 
little to hinder their coordination. Possibly they might profit from experience in the task with their first partner 142 
and be able to coordinate more quickly with subsequent partners. However, if they used simpler coordination 143 
strategies (e.g. always press the same button) then we would not expect an improvement across partners, and 144 
would expect coordination to drop in the first sessions with a new partner. 145 
As an additional indicator of how they were solving the task we looked at how many of the buttons (i.e. 146 
how many of the possible solutions) they used to coordinate in a given session. In this case, our prediction was 147 
that a better understanding of the task and flexible coordinating strategy would allow pairs to use a greater range 148 
of solutions per session. Finally, we examined the strategies supporting reliable coordination: whether pairs 149 
were using a leader-follower strategy by waiting for a partner to choose first, and how they were using 150 
communication to coordinate. Overall, our main aim was to investigate whether, in the context of this simple 151 
coordination game, there would be species differences in coordination strategies that would indicate the 152 
cognitive or social-cognitive differences in coordination skills. 153 
 154 
Study 1: Chimpanzee Coordination 155 
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  156 
Materials & Methods  157 
Subjects 158 
 Sixteen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes); six males and ten females were included in the final analyses 159 
(mean age= 21.4 years, range: 8-37 years, see supplementary materials for full subjects table). All subjects had 160 
extensive research experience with a wide range of experimental tasks. Seven additional subjects started the 161 
study but were not included in the final sample, either due to lack of motivation (N=2), because they 162 
consistently made more than one choice per trial (see procedure for further details; N=2), due to interference 163 
from a dependent offspring (N=1), or because their partner was excluded from the study (N= 2). Subjects were 164 
divided into two groups according to the social groups in which they were housed in (Group A, N=10; Group B, 165 
N=6). Partners were assigned pseudo-randomly according to the constraints of the study design. As individuals 166 
were in separate rooms during testing and food rewards were delivered directly to the respective rooms, 167 
tolerance was not a major concern, though individuals known to be intolerant were not paired together. Subjects 168 
could choose to stop participating at any time. All chimpanzees were housed at Wolfgang Köhler Primate 169 
Research Center, Leipzig Zoo, Germany. They were never food deprived and water was available ad libitum 170 
throughout testing. 171 
 172 
Materials 173 
 Single-choice (training) box. The main feature of the single-choice apparatus was that it had two 174 
‘buttons’ on either side. The apparatus was positioned in an alcove between two cages and one button could be 175 
accessed from each of the two adjacent cages (see ESM for schematic of set-up). The rest of the apparatus could 176 
only be accessed by the experimenter. It was constructed from PVC and Plexiglas. The buttons were actually the 177 
ends of solid plastic cylinders, which if pushed into the apparatus would move a lever and subsequently slide a 178 
horizontal Plexiglas panel towards the subject. The two panels associated with each of the buttons were lying on 179 
top of each other, covering a hole. If both buttons were pressed, the panels moved back, revealing the hole and 180 
any food items placed on top of the panels would fall down and become accessible to the subject. As long as one 181 
button had not yet been pressed the panels prevented the food from falling. Two larger semi-transparent panels 182 
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(operated by the experimenters) could slide down in front of the two faces of the apparatus, blocking access to 183 
the buttons between trials. 184 
 Four-choice box. The four-choice box consisted of four single-button modules, so that four buttons 185 
(approx. 16cm apart.) could be accessed on either side of the apparatus (see Figure 1(a)). The whole box was 186 
68x100x31cm. Each button module was associated with rewards (one piece for each subject per module). Only 187 
when both buttons on either side had been pressed was the food associated with those buttons released, one 188 
piece to either cage. Between trials the experimenter blocked access to the apparatus with semi-transparent 189 
panels covering the two faces of the apparatus accessible to the chimpanzees. When one choice was made, the 190 
remaining three were locked automatically by opaque plastic doors. Hence, only one choice could be made on 191 
each trial. After a choice was made all three doors associated with buttons that had not been pressed would 192 
lower. In contrast, the door associated with the button that had been chosen remained elevated, providing extra 193 
visual signals of which choice had been made. More than one button could be pressed simultaneously, thus 194 
increasing odds of success. Subjects that did this consistently were excluded from the study (N=2). Fifteen of 195 
the remaining subjects did occasionally press multiple buttons but did not use this strategy consistently (0.66% 196 
of all trials). 197 
 198 
Procedure and Design 199 
Training. Subjects completed four training phases to familiarise them with the task. All training was 200 
completed individually. Each phase was conducted on separate days.  201 
The first three phases were with the single-choice apparatus. In Phase 1 subjects were paired with an 202 
experimenter, who pressed her button at the start of the trial. To access the food reward subjects were required to 203 
press the button on their side. Subjects proceeded to the next phase after acquiring the reward within one 204 
minute, on three consecutive trials (M =4.3 trials to pass, range 3-18).   205 
 Phase 2 used the same set-up but the experimenter either pressed her button as soon as the trial started 206 
(as in the previous phase), or five seconds after the subject. This was to draw attention to the fact that actions 207 
needed to be performed on both sides of the apparatus to gain access to the rewards. Subjects all received the 208 
same experience in this phase: four trials (two of each type) on either side of the apparatus (eight trials in total). 209 
Each side of the apparatus was conducted on a separate day. 210 
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 During Phase 3 subjects had access to both sides of the single-choice apparatus (the door between the 211 
two rooms was open) and were required to acquire the food alone by pressing on both sides (within one minute 212 
on three consecutive trials; M=3.4 trials to completion, range 3-7). 213 
 Finally, subjects were familiarised with the four-choice box without rewards. They had one trial of up 214 
to five minutes to push a button on either side of the apparatus and to experience the locking mechanism. 215 
 Test trials. Subjects were presented with the four-choice apparatus in two conditions in a within-216 
subjects design. In the dyadic condition subjects were tested in pairs. Each subject only had access to one side of 217 
the apparatus. Only when partners made corresponding choices would each receive one of the rewards 218 
associated with that choice. In the solo condition individual subjects had access to both sides of the apparatus 219 
and could retrieve both rewards associated with a button.  220 
Before the trial began all four choices were baited with two food items. During baiting and re-setting 221 
between trials two large semi-transparent panels blocked access to the apparatus. Through this the chimpanzees 222 
could see that the experimenter was manipulating the apparatus but it was difficult to see exactly what the 223 
experimenter was doing (e.g. where re-baiting occurred). At the start of the trial the panels were removed by two 224 
experimenters. The trial ended when one choice had been made on either side, or three minutes had passed 225 
without a choice being made at which point the large panels were replaced. The buttons were re-set and the 226 
rewards replenished between each trial. 227 
 Each session consisted of 10 trials. Grapes were used as a reward for trials 1-5 and pellets (a higher-228 
value food) for 6-10 to maintain motivation (if subjects did not press on a trial with grapes the next trial used 229 
pellets to increase motivation). If subjects did not press on three trials during a session, the session ended and 230 
continued on another day (this occurred on 24 occasions across all test sessions). Solo and dyadic test sessions 231 
differed only in whether subjects were tested alone (in which case the door between rooms was open to allow 232 
access to both sides of the apparatus) or in pairs (with one individual in each room). 233 
 Subjects were considered to have demonstrated coordination after pressing corresponding buttons 234 
significantly more often than chance on two consecutive sessions. The chance of both chimpanzees pressing a 235 
specific button, e.g. button 1, is 0.0625 (0.25*0.25) but since there are four sets of corresponding buttons (four 236 
potential solutions) the chance increases to 0.25 (0.0625*4).   Thus, coordination was considered to be 6/10 237 
successful trials (binomial test, p<0.05). However, as subjects initially seemed to be avoiding the button closest 238 
to the experimenter, a more conservative criterion of 7/10 on two consecutive sessions was applied (significantly 239 
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above chance for a probability of success of 0.33); at the time of making this decision this button had been 240 
chosen in 4% of cases from a total of 390 trials with 7 pairs. The reason for the apparent avoidance is unclear as 241 
the button furthest from the experimenter was not the most common choice at this point and the avoidance was 242 
not as strong by the end of the experiment (see results section below). Pairs or individuals completed a 243 
maximum of 18 sessions. 244 
Subjects were divided into two treatment groups that corresponded to the social groups in which they 245 
were housed. Members of group A were presented with the dyadic condition first. If they coordinated with their 246 
first partner, they were re-paired in a second round (with a partner that had also successfully coordinated with 247 
their previous partner) and, if successful, a third. Thus, individuals in group A had up to three partners before 248 
moving on to the solo condition. If they passed the solo condition, they returned to the dyadic condition for a 249 
maximum of two rounds. To investigate whether solving the problem individually first would improve 250 
subsequent coordination with a partner, group B started with the solo condition before moving on to the dyadic 251 
condition (with up to two partners due to the smaller number of individuals in the group). See ESM Table S1 for 252 
the full list of partners for each individual. 253 
 Dyads that successfully coordinated were shuffled to form new pairings. For Group A this was repeated 254 
so that each individual had up to three different partners prior to the solo condition. All individuals in Group A 255 
also took part in the solo condition regardless of their previous performance in the dyadic condition. Finally, 256 
those that successfully completed the solo condition went on to a second dyadic phase with new partners. For 257 
Group B all individuals completed the solo condition before those that were successful were paired for the 258 
dyadic condition. As far as possible pairs were formed from individuals that had shown preferences for different 259 
button numbers in their previous pairing (see results for further details). 260 
 Subjects were always on the same side of the box within a dyad (randomly assigned) but this was 261 
counterbalanced across dyads.   262 
 Refresher training. Between different test conditions subjects were given ‘refresher training’. This 263 
training was identical to phase 3  of training (including the pass criterion) and aimed to refresh their 264 
understanding that choices on both sides of the apparatus are necessary to retrieve the rewards. 265 
 Coding. All sessions were recorded using three digital cameras. For each trial the experimenter 266 
recorded the choice of each subject, and whether or not they were successful in retrieving the reward. 267 
Analysis. To test the effect of condition on the number of sessions to successful coordination and the 268 
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number of trials in the first sessions ending in success, we compared pairs with their first partner in group A with 269 
individual performances of members of group B in the solo condition with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test; thus, we 270 
compared independent samples while controlling for experience with the task. We used non-parametric survival 271 
analysis (Kaplan-Meier estimate of survival and log-rank test) to analyse the effect of group, partner number, or 272 
of passing the solo condition, on the number of sessions to success in the dyadic condition and the effect of 273 
group on the number of sessions to success in the solo condition, correcting for multiple testing where 274 
appropriate. This analysis takes into account the fact that testing was halted prior to some individuals/pairs 275 
coordinating successfully. We used non-parametric tests because the Cox models did not fulfil proportional 276 
hazards assumptions. We report medians (with 95% confidence intervals) based on the Kaplan-Meier estimate 277 
of survival for the number of sessions to pass criterion for coordination.   278 
Generalised linear mixed models were employed to analyse the effects of group (condition order) and 279 
partner number on success in the first session in the dyadic condition, controlling for individual and pair 280 
identities. We used Generalised Liner Mixed Models (GLMMs; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) with Poisson 281 
error structure for all analyses. Prior to inspection of the model results, we conducted an overall test of the full 282 
model (with all test and control variables) compared to the null model (the full model without test variables) 283 
using a likelihood ratio test. Only when this was significant did we consider the model results. The significance 284 
of test variables was tested individually using drop1 function of the lme4 package (using a likelihood ratio test). 285 
If the model included an interaction that was not found to contribute significantly to the model it was removed 286 
to produce a reduced model.   287 
Finally, we used Fisher’s Exact test to analyse the distribution of preferred choices across buttons 288 
between conditions. Analysis was performed using R v3.0.1 (R Core Team, 2012), and the functions Surv and 289 
survfitt in the package survival; glmer in the package lme4; and CrossTable in the package gmodels. See 290 
supplementary materials for further details of the models. 291 
 292 
 Results and Discussion 293 
Overall, the results show that chimpanzees are able to solve this coordination problem. With their first 294 
partner in the dyadic condition most pairs (7/8) could eventually coordinate reliably. This coordination success 295 
could be achieved in several different ways. One is by simply returning to a successful button, without any 296 
consideration of the behavior of their partner. Alternatively, with an understanding of the role of the partner, 297 
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coordination could be achieved by responding to, predicting or influencing a partner’s choices. To investigate 298 
this, we recombined pairs. If, through experience with the task, they had developed a flexible coordination 299 
strategy based on the decisions of themselves and their partner they should reach criterion more quickly with 300 
subsequent partners. We did not find evidence that pairs became quicker to coordinate with their new partners 301 
(Mdn=11 sessions, 95% CI [6, 18]; χ24=2.1, p=0.71, N=23; see Figure 2(a)). There were also no significant 302 
differences between pairs tested before completing the solo condition and those tested after passing the solo 303 
condition (comparing first partners only: χ21=0, p=0.95, N=8) nor between groups A and B (χ21=0.7, p=0.40, 304 
N=23). As a second measure of coordination success we analysed the number of successful trials in the first 305 
session and found no evidence of improvement in first session success across partners (M= 3.0, SD= 2.7; χ2= 306 
1.60, df= 2, p = .45, N=23; see Figure 2(a)). In fact, success in the first sessions was very close to chance level 307 
(see Figure 2a; chance=2.5 trials).  308 
The majority of chimpanzees (13/16) passed the solo condition. They were able to solve the task more 309 
quickly alone than in the dyadic condition (Mdn solo= 4; Mdn dyadic=10; W =29, p<0.01, N=11, Mdn 310 
difference=6.5, 95% CI [2, 10]) but there were no significant differences between conditions in first session 311 
success (W=16.5, p=0.79, N=11, Mdn difference=0.5, 95% CI [-7, 5]). There were also no differences between 312 
groups in the solo condition in either measure (number of sessions: Mdn Group a = 5.5, 95% CI [4, NA]; Mdn 313 
Group b =4.0, 95% CI [2, NA]; χ21=2.4, p=0.12, N=16; first session success: χ22=2.4, p=0.30, N=16). This 314 
difference between conditions indicated that coordinating with a partner created an additional challenge for the 315 
chimpanzees. It should be noted that the increase in sessions to success in dyadic condition is based on 316 
comparison between two separate social groups (housed in the same zoo with auditory and limited visual access 317 
to each other), so it is possible that group differences rather than experimental manipulation underlies this effect. 318 
However, we did not have any a priori expectations for differences in performance between groups and we did 319 
not find any significant differences in our main measures, increasing our confidence that this is a condition 320 
effect. Each of the four possible solutions to the task (i.e. each set of buttons) resulted in an equal value of 321 
reward; thus, if partners were coordinating flexibly with their partner they could potentially coordinate on the 322 
whole range of solutions. However, pairs tended to converge on one single set of buttons (M=1.21 sets per 323 
session per pair, SD=0.22), presumably by choosing the option that had previously led to success. One possible 324 
explanation for this is that one set of buttons was perceptually salient and thus attracted the attention of both 325 
individuals to it, leading them to choose this preferentially and consequently to coordinate. In contradiction to 326 
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this explanation, there was no indication of a clearly preferred option overall: there was some evidence of 327 
avoidance of the button closest to the experimenter (representing 12% choices) but choices were distributed 328 
evenly across the remaining three boxes (representing 28-31% choices each). We used this variation across pairs 329 
to reduce the likelihood of pairs coordinating by chance: each new pairing, as far as possible, was made up of 330 
individuals who had coordinated on a different set of buttons in the previous round. Thus, in achieving 331 
coordination with new partners, chimpanzees did show some flexibility. 332 
Individuals in the solo condition also generally used one set of buttons (M=1.33 set per session per pair, 333 
SD=0.25), but the distribution of choices differed to that of the dyadic condition (χ23=191.33, p<0.01, N=7086).  334 
The pattern suggests that each pair converges on one set of buttons (and this differed between pairs). This results 335 
in successful but somewhat inflexible coordination, as new solutions to the problem need to be re-established 336 
with new partners.   337 
Chimpanzees were able to coordinate but solving the task with a partner seemed to make it 338 
significantly more difficult for them in comparison to solving the task alone. In study 2 we investigated whether 339 
this was the case for 4 year old children. 340 
 341 
Study 2: Children’s coordination 342 
 343 
In the second study we investigated how young children would solve the same coordination problem. Our aim 344 
was to reproduce the basic structure and logic of the chimpanzee study as closely as possible to be able to 345 
compare coordination strategies. The main exception was that young children cannot do so many trials, and so 346 
we reduced our sessions to five trials each. 347 
 348 
Materials & Methods 349 
Subjects 350 
  Forty 4 year old children were included in the final analyses; 20 boys and 20 girls (Mage=50.8 months, 351 
range =48-54 months). We chose 4 year olds to provide a comparison to a previous coordination game also 352 
played by 4 year old children and chimpanzees (Duguid et al., 2014). Additionally, pilot testing indicated that 353 
this was the youngest age that they reliably engaged in the task. They were paired in 47 dyads, with each child 354 
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tested with up to 3 different partners. Both children in the dyad were from the same kindergarten, but not 355 
necessarily the same class (26 dyads from the same class and 21 from different classes). In order to maximise 356 
the number of potential dyads children were paired with same and different sex partners (mixed-sex = 29 dyads, 357 
female = 9 dyads, and male = 9 dyads). A further 11 children completed the training but were not included in the 358 
final sample either because there was no partner available for them (i.e. there was an odd number of children at 359 
a particular kindergarten, N=3 children), or because they were not available to complete the required number of 360 
sessions with their first partner (N= 8 children). All testing took place at kindergartens in the Leipzig city area, 361 
Germany; the children were recruited from a database of parents who volunteered to take part in child 362 
development studies. 363 
 364 
Materials 365 
 The design and size of the single-choice (training) box and four-choice box were identical to study 1, 366 
with the exception of lighter building materials (e.g. wood) and some painting to make the task more appealing 367 
to the children (see Figure 1(b)). The children’s apparatus also included two large red cardboard barriers to 368 
occlude the apparatus between trials (similar to the large panels used in the ape apparatus). Additionally, rather 369 
than food rewards, children could release two red wooden balls by pressing the corresponding buttons. These 370 
balls could be used to produce music from a “pling machine” by rolling the balls down a tube on the machine 371 
(this reward method has been used successfully in a number of previous studies, e.g. Moore, Mueller, Kaminski, 372 
& Tomasello, 2015; Rakoczy, Grafenhain, Cluver, Dalhoff, & Sternkopf, 2014; Wobber, Herrmann, Hare, 373 
Wrangham, & Tomasello, 2014).   374 
 375 
Procedure and Design 376 
 Training. The first experimenter introduced herself during a short warm-up phase and engaged the 377 
child in conversation before starting the training. A second experimenter operated and reset the apparatuses but 378 
most of the interaction was with the first experimenter to reduce the likelihood that children would engage the 379 
second experimenter during the task. Children completed the same four training phases as the chimpanzees. 380 
They were trained individually and completed all phases in one session in order to reduce the total number of 381 
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testing days. One additional trial with the single-choice box was added to the end of the children’s training so 382 
that the session would end with a positive experience. 383 
 To keep the training as comparable as possible, the experimenter used minimal verbal instructions. 384 
Most importantly, the experimenter did not explain how the box worked so that the children would not have 385 
information about the mechanism unavailable to the chimpanzees. This included not referring to the different 386 
choices as buttons. 387 
 Test trials. As in study 1 participants were presented with the four-choice apparatus in two conditions 388 
in a within-subjects design. In the dyadic condition children were tested in pairs, with each subject having 389 
access to one side of the apparatus. In the solo condition individual subjects had access to both sides of the 390 
apparatus, and could retrieve both rewards associated with a button by making corresponding choices on either 391 
side.  392 
The procedure for test trials was very similar to the chimpanzees’. Before the trial began all four 393 
choices were baited with two balls. At the start of the trial the second experimenter removed the panels so that 394 
the subject(s) had access to the buttons. The trial ended when one choice had been made on either side, at which 395 
point the panels were replaced. The buttons were re-set and the rewards replenished between each trial. 396 
 Children were given sessions of 5 trials (in contrast to the 10 trials for chimpanzees), and up to 5 397 
sessions (25 trials) on the same day to reduce the total number of testing days. The first test session was on the 398 
same day as the training. They were tested with a single partner on any given day. Dyads were considered to be 399 
successfully coordinating after pressing corresponding buttons on 4/5 trials in two consecutive sessions 400 
(binomial test, p<0.05) and completed a maximum of 8 sessions (40 trials). This performance criterion (4/5 401 
successful trials) was significantly above chance at a probability of success of both 0.25 and 0.33, thus this 402 
criterion was as conservative as that used for chimpanzees (probability of success = 0.33).  The solo condition 403 
consisted of two sessions of five trials. Again, at least 4/5 correct in both blocks was considered successful. 404 
 All children were tested with up to three partners in the dyadic condition. In contrast to the 405 
chimpanzees they were always tested in the solo condition after completing the dyadic condition. As in study 1, 406 
pairs that successfully coordinated were re-shuffled. Only children who successfully coordinated with a first 407 
partner were paired with a second partner and third partner. In some cases, children were not available, or a 408 
partner was not available to be tested with a second or third partner. In total 19 dyads were first partners; 18 409 
dyads were second partners; and 10 dyads were third partners. As far as possible, chimpanzees were shuffled in 410 
Accepted Manuscript: SOLVING A SIMPLE COORDINATION PROBLEM 16 
 
16 
a way that would minimise the likelihood that new partners would coordinate by chance by pairing individuals 411 
that had converged on different buttons with previous partners. This was not possible for child dyads as they did 412 
not show the same pattern of convergence (see section 3.2). As many subjects as possible were tested in the solo 413 
condition, after completing the dyadic condition (N children tested after first partner=4, second partner =11, 414 
third partner =14).      415 
Coding. In addition to coding all decisions (as in Study 1), in order to get a better understanding of 416 
how pairs were coordinating in the dyadic condition, a subset of sessions from successful dyads of both children 417 
and chimpanzees were coded in more detail. For the two sessions in which pairs reached criterion and, if 418 
applicable, the two preceding this, we recorded the time between partners pushing as well as communication for 419 
both species. 420 
The timing of decisions were categorised as simultaneous (≤1s between decisions of both partners) or 421 
sequential (>1s between decisions). To characterise the communication within dyads we were interested whether 422 
they a) used attention-getters to direct a partner’s attention to the task, e.g. calling their name or, for the apes 423 
using noisy gestures such as knocking on the panel between them and their partner, and b) whether they referred 424 
to a specific box, e.g. by pointing to a button, or saying “here” or “this one”. Only communication that occurred 425 
during the trial was coded (from when the barriers were lifted until both individuals had made their decision). 426 
Reliability. A second coder,  blind to the hypotheses, coded four of the successful pairs of chimpanzees 427 
and eight of the successful pairs of children for which box was chosen (K chimpanzees=1.00; Kchildren=1.00), timing 428 
of decisions (simultaneous or sequential; K chimpanzees=0.94; Kchildren=0.97), and communication events 429 
(Kchimpanzees=0.99; Kchildren=0.97) and type (Kchimpanzees=1.00; Kchildren=0.92). For events that occurred very 430 
infrequently (communication in chimpanzees) we calculated a prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (Byrt, 431 
Bishop & Carlin, 1993). 432 
Analysis. The main analyses were performed as in Study 1 for comparability: non-parametric survival 433 
analysis to test the effects of partner number, gender (girls, boys or mixed pairs), and whether they were in the 434 
same kindergarten class on the number of sessions to successful coordination. GLMM’s were used to test the 435 
effects of the same predictors on coordination success in the first session. To compare independent samples of 436 
first session success in the dyadic condition to the solo condition, we compared pairs tested with a third partner 437 
to individuals tested in the solo condition after their second partner using a Wilcoxin rank-sum test. Since all 438 
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children completed the solo condition only after the dyadic condition this was the best comparison to the 439 
chimpanzees’ data that controlled for experience (see ESM for further details). 440 
In addition, GLMM’s were used to analyse species differences in the timing of decisions (simultaneous 441 
or sequential) and communication. To run these analyses we used the subset of sessions coded for the relative 442 
timing of both partner’s decisions and communication between partners during the trial. In both full models we 443 
included as test variables: species and session success (whether the session was one of the two above criterion, 444 
or the two prior to that), partner number as a control variable; and the random effects: identity of the pair, and 445 
the identity of each of the individuals in the pair. 446 
 447 
 448 
Results and Discussion 449 
Children’s Coordination 450 
The four year old children were very successful at coordinating in this task. This was already evident 451 
with their first partner. All 19 of the initial pairings reached criterion and did so very quickly (Mdn= 3 sessions, 452 
95% CI [2, 3]). The picture was similar with second and third partners (see Figure 2(b)). With their second 453 
partner most pairs reached criterion (16 of 18), and in a median of 2 sessions (the minimum possible, 95% CI [2, 454 
4]). With their third partner all pairs were successful (10/10; Mdn = 2 sessions, 95% CI [2, NA]). Overall, the 455 
number of sessions required to coordination reliably did not decrease significantly with the number of partners, 456 
though there was a trend in this direction (χ22=5.4, p=0.068, N=47); this may be because the children were 457 
reaching the criterion so quickly from the onset. There was significant improvement in first session success 458 
across partners (estimate±s.e.= 0.24±0.10; χ2= 5.26, df= 1, p=0.02, N=47, see Figure 2(b)). There were no 459 
significant effects of the sex of the dyad or whether they were form the same kindergarten class on either 460 
measure of performance. 461 
Pairs of children were coordinating on a wide range of solutions within each session: about two-thirds 462 
of pairs were using three or four sets of buttons within a session (M =1.94 buttons used per session per dyad, 463 
SD=0.94). As there were only five trials per session, this meant that for many pairs their coordination was 464 
flexible enough to switch between buttons on almost every trial. However, a significant number of pairs were 465 
also very similar to the chimpanzees: converging on one or two buttons.  466 
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Children were also very successful in the solo condition.  Due to time constraints the solo condition 467 
was restricted to two sessions, and they either passed immediately (>4/5 on both sessions) or failed. The 468 
majority of children passed within these two sessions (24 of 29). A comparison of performance in the first 469 
session between solo and dyadic conditions shows no significant difference (W=57, p=0.90, N=21, Mdn 470 
difference<0.01, 95% CI [-1, 1]).). This suggests that coordinating with a partner was no more difficult than 471 
completing the task independently.    472 
 473 
Comparison of coordination between children and chimpanzees 474 
A more detailed analysis of successful coordination in both species suggests two ways in which 475 
children’s coordination differed from the chimpanzees. We compared the behaviour of the chimpanzees in Study 476 
1 to the children in Study 2. The relative timing of decisions indicates the first way in which coordination 477 
differed, in this context. One way to solve this coordination problem is a leader-follower strategy: one partner 478 
waits for the other to act first and then follows her lead. This is particularly efficient in situations with complete 479 
visual access and abundant time to make decisions such as the current task. We compared the proportion of 480 
decisions that were made simultaneously (within 1s of each other) with those that were sequential (>1s between 481 
decisions), with the assumption that increased time between decisions allows for the possibility of a leader-482 
follower strategy. In the majority of trials children made sequential decisions, more so than chimpanzees 483 
(Mchildren=72.85% sequential decisions per dyad, SD= 22.93; Mchimpanzees=43.99%, SE=27.70; estimate±s.e.= -484 
1.50±0.44; χ2= 10.36, df= 1, p<0.01, N=1227 trials). This is consistent with the idea that children were following 485 
a partner’s decision. It would also explain how some children (N=5) did not perform above chance in the solo 486 
condition but were successful in the dyadic condition: as long as one individual can wait for their partner to 487 
initiate, they can follow.  488 
 A second way to coordinate is to communicate decisions to a partner. Children were more likely to 489 
communicate to each other about the task (via gestures or vocalisation) than chimpanzees were 490 
(Mchildren=26.22% trials per dyad, SD= 33.46; Mchimpanzees=3.12%, SD=5.10; estimate±s.e.= 2.69±0.90; χ2= 8.01, 491 
df= 1, p<0.01, N=1227 trials). In most cases this included a verbal and/or gestural reference to a specific choice, 492 
e.g. saying “here” while pointing to the button they had/were about to choose (78.10% trials with 493 
communication included an act of reference to a specific choice), rather than more general attention-getters such 494 
as calling their partner’s name. Children often communicated before either of them had made their decision 495 
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(54.01% trials with communication were pre-decision). This is different from the type of communication 496 
observed with the chimpanzees: in the few instances in which they did communicate they used gestural 497 
attention-getters, but did not refer to specific choices. Typically, this involved a noisy gesture towards a partner 498 
(e.g. knocking in the wire mesh between the cages) while waiting for them to make their decision after having 499 
already made their own choice. We reduced the likelihood of coding signs of general frustration with the task by 500 
coding gestures directed towards the partner, however, to better determine whether the behaviours we observed 501 
were intended to solicit action from the partner, we would need an additional version of the task in which 502 
communication was not possible. 503 
 While children do communicate substantially more often than chimpanzees in this situation, 40% of 504 
pairs did not communicate about the task. Despite the lack of verbal or gestural communication, they were still 505 
highly successful at coordinating their decisions. This highlights an important point that language may be a very 506 
useful tool, not only for coordination (see e.g. Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012) but it is not the 507 
only tool available for coordinating with others and it is likely that a suite of socio-cognitive capacities support 508 
human collaboration. 509 
 510 
 511 
General Discussion 512 
 513 
 The results of the two studies demonstrate that children and chimpanzees used very different strategies 514 
to solve the same coordination problem. Chimpanzees took many sessions to converge on a successful solution 515 
with each partner, and less successfully than in an individual version of the task. Children were already efficient 516 
at coordinating with their first partner, but still showed signs of improvement with further partners. Children 517 
were able to use the range of possible solutions (sets of buttons) flexibly by using a leader-follower strategy and 518 
communication to inform or direct partners towards a set of buttons. 519 
Our results extend previous findings showing that four year old children are able to cooperate and 520 
coordinate decisions when there is a salient optimal solution for both partners (Duguid et al., 2014; Wyman et 521 
al., 2013). In the current task all options were of equal value, perceptually similar and visible to both players so 522 
to coordinate effectively participants had to take each other’s decisions into account and adjust their own 523 
accordingly. At 4 years old, children are efficient at solving the coordination problem with peers in an 524 
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interactive context where they are able to see each other and communicate freely. This ability makes way for the 525 
capacity to coordinate with absent partners (when no communication is possible) at the age of 5 or 6 using skills 526 
such as second-order theory of mind or cultural common ground (Goldvicht-Bacon & Diesendruck, 2016; 527 
Grueneisen et al., 2015a; Grueneisen et al., 2015b). 528 
It is clear that communication can be used to solve coordination problems like the one presented here: 529 
by pointing out one of the four buttons individuals can make their intentions clear so that there is no longer a 530 
dilemma for their partner. We see that the children do make use of verbal and gestural communication for this 531 
purpose. However, it is also interesting to note that they only do so in about 25% trials, and 40% of pairs did not 532 
communicate at all. This strongly suggests that explicit communication may be an important tool for solving the 533 
problem but it is not the only way in which they can coordinate. These pairs may have simple strategies to 534 
coordinate, for example, they were successful once and simply continued to make the same choice or followed 535 
the choices of a naïve leader.  Research with adults suggests that they will make their choices, or the movements 536 
of instrumental actions, more predictable to facilitate coordination (e.g. Mehta et al., 1994a; Vesper, van der 537 
Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011). It possible that the children in this study were also using more subtle forms of 538 
communication. The right kind of eye contact from an adult experimenter can facilitate cooperation in children 539 
of similar ages in the stag hunt game (Siposova, Tomasello, & Carpenter, 2018; Wyman et al., 2013) and we 540 
observed children making choices in predictable patterns (e.g. going from one end of the box to the other). 541 
However, we would need further investigation to formulate and test specific hypotheses of how these more 542 
subtle types of communication could facilitate coordination in the current context in which dyads need to 543 
coordinate between multiple equivalent options. For example, with versions of the task in which children cannot 544 
communicate at all, or only visually, we would expect reduced ability to coordinate successfully, or for children 545 
to rely on less flexible strategies such as converging on one choice by chance.   546 
The overall pattern of coordination was qualitatively different for the chimpanzees: as well as taking 547 
several sessions to reach criterion they did not quickly adapt to new partners, converging to a single set of 548 
buttons rather than flexibly switching between them. One explanation for this pattern is that individuals simply 549 
return to successful buttons without any consideration of their partner’s actions. This explains the time required 550 
to establish reliable coordination, but it is efficient once achieved. It is not possible to rule out this strategy, 551 
however, two findings suggest that this does not completely account for their decisions. The first is that 552 
individuals were quicker to solve the task alone than with a partner, indicating that coordinating with a partner is 553 
an additional challenge but one that many of them did eventually succeed in. Secondly, chimpanzees did 554 
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communicate with attention-getters to engage a partner while waiting for their partners to choose, indicating an 555 
understanding that the partner’s action is necessary. This form of communication is similar to the way 556 
chimpanzees have communicated in previous experimental situations in which they required help from 557 
conspecifics e.g. (Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2012; Yamamoto & Tanaka, 2009). Our evidence suggests that, 558 
chimpanzees in this task do take into account that a partner needs to act but not which actions a partner takes 559 
within a test trial. Once pairs discover a successful solution, they can maintain success with the same partner 560 
without communicating or even monitoring their decisions. 561 
Previously, Bullinger et al. (2011) suggested that chimpanzees were using a leader-follower strategy, to 562 
coordinate their decisions in a stag hunt coordination problem. This strategy could account for the condition 563 
differences in the present coordination problem: when operating the puzzle-box alone, their actions were always 564 
sequential so the information about their own choice was always available. However, in the dyadic condition 565 
this did not appear be the main strategy, individuals did not wait for information about their partner’s choice. In 566 
other cooperative tasks chimpanzees have shown that they are capable of waiting in order to work together (e.g. 567 
the ‘loose string’ task; (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2009). These 568 
studies, however, have included training during which individuals learn that any action before the arrival of a 569 
partner results in task failure. In the current set up, waiting only provides useful information about a partner’s 570 
decision but is not necessary to operate the puzzle box successfully. Although apes have been shown to inhibit 571 
choices to seek information actively in non-social contexts (e.g. Bohn, Allritz, Call, & Völter, 2017; Call, 2010), 572 
evidence from cooperative tasks suggests that this may be more difficult in social contexts (Bullinger, Melis, & 573 
Tomasello, 2014 and the current study). Further studies would be necessary to determine whether factors such as 574 
task complexity, inhibition or metacognitive skills contribute to this apparent difficulty. Another difference 575 
between the current task and that of tasks like Bullinger et al. (2011), and more recently Melis & Tomasello 576 
(2019), that would make a leader follower strategy more challenging is that the dimensions of the apparatus 577 
preclude the use of body position of the partner to indicate a choice. Instead the chimpanzees have to focus on 578 
manual actions or gestures, or the apparatus itself, which may be less salient signals.    579 
Investigating the proximate mechanisms of human and chimpanzee collaboration in a mutualistic 580 
context is key to fully understanding the evolution of human cooperation (Balliet, Tybur, & Lange; Balliet et al., 581 
2017; Tomasello, 2016) and our results contribute to the developing picture of the way chimpanzees and 582 
children coordinate their decisions. In previous experiments where the costs of coordination failure were low 583 
and there was a salient, high value choice both chimpanzees and children were very successful at coordinating 584 
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their actions with a partner (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006; Melis et al., 2009; Wyman et al., 2013). 585 
However, when the costs increase (Duguid et al., 2014) and when efficient coordination requires coordination of 586 
decisions (such as in the current task) humans seem to excel. The way in which communication is used by both 587 
species indicates significant differences in their coordination strategies: children are engaging with their peers to 588 
solve the problem together even before making any choices, while chimpanzees seem to solve the problem more 589 
individualistically. The current task was designed specifically to investigate coordination when it is difficult to 590 
make predictions about a partner’s behaviour (because all the options are of equal value and effort). However, to 591 
understand how chimpanzees coordinate decisions during activities such as group hunting or decisions about 592 
travel directions, another essential avenue of research will be to examine whether chimpanzees use the same 593 
socio-cognitive abilities shown in competitive tasks to predict conspecific behaviour in cooperative contexts and 594 
coordinate with them (e.g. Grueneisen, Duguid, Saur, & Tomasello, 2017; Karg, Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 595 
2015). If these abilities are context-specific we can gain a clearer picture of the of proximate mechanisms 596 
underlying coordination in chimpanzees as well the evolutionary history of human cooperation. Overall, the 597 
current results are consistent with the view that humans have evolved socio-cognitive skills supporting the 598 
ability to coordinate decisions effectively in the context of mutualistic collaboration.  599 
 600 
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Figure 1. Experimental set-up in dyadic condition for (a) chimpanzees and (b) 4-year old children. In the solo 746 
condition individual participants were able to move around the puzzle-box. i) One of the ‘buttons’ available to 747 
the participants; ii) the sliding doors that lock the remaining choices after one button has been pressed; iii) the 748 
rewards, one for each partner.  749 
 750 
Figure 2. Coordination success across sessions for chimpanzees (a) and children (b) for partner numbers 1-3. 751 
The red vertical line indicates the median number of sessions to reach criterion. The red point (+ 95% CI) 752 
indicates the mean success in session 1. Each pair tested is represented by a dashed line.   753 
 754 
 755 
